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Comments
CLASS IS IN SESSION: PUTATIVE CLASS
ACTION COULD FOREVER ALTER THE “GRANT-IN-AID”
COMPENSATION OF COLLEGE ATHLETES
“As long as the NCAA continues to allow college athletics to be promoted as
big-time television entertainment and then collects all the dollars that go
along with this, I don’t see how it can do anything more than chase rats
from a sinking ship.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
The multibillion dollar per year industry related to Division I
National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) athletics is built
around the athletic performances of scholarship compensated ath-
letes, with schools supplying “more than $2.9 billion in athletics
scholarships annually” to athletes in exchange for their athletic ser-
vices.2  The financial aid that athletes receive through athletics
scholarships covers many of their educational expenses, but until
recently, could not cover the true cost to attend their schools like a
student loan might. 3  For a long time, the NCAA restricted this
1. Declaration of Steve W. Berman in Support of Consolidated Plaintiffs’ Mo-
tion for Class Certification of Damages Classes, Exhibit 57, at 7, In re Nat’l Col-
legiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 4:14-md-02541) [hereinafter Declaration of Steve W.
Berman] (quoting anonymous response to NCAA survey produced by NCAA and
written “sometime between 2002 and 2009”); see also Order Granting Unopposed
Administrative Motion to Unseal Unredacted Consolidated Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Certification of Damages Classes and Unredacted Declaration of Steve W. Berman,
In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 311
F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 4:14-md-02541) (ordering public filing of consol-
idated plaintiffs’ motion and documents).
2. Scholarships, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/scholar
ships [https://perma.cc/DF9G-RZWQ] (last visited Mar. 13, 2016) (explaining
scholarship system); see also NCAA Recruiting Facts, NCAA (July 2016), https://
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Recruiting%20Fact%20Sheet%20WEB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W6BX-TT9V] (stating that 56% of 176,000 Division 1 ath-
letes—or approximately 98,560—receive athletics aid).
3. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2016–17 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, By-
law 12.02.2 (2016) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapub
lications.com/productdownloads/D117.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y84-WQX9].
Player compensation is limited to
(a) Meals; (b) Lodging; (c) Apparel, equipment and supplies; (d) Coach-
ing and instruction;(e) Health/medical insurance; (f ) Transportation
(expenses to and from practice and competition, cost of transportation
(237)
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“grant-in-aid” to tuition, university fees, room and board, and re-
quired course materials.4  While attending school, athletes accrue
incidental expenses, such as sundry items and laundry expenses,
but the NCAA noticeably prohibited its member schools from pro-
viding funds to cover these expenses in exchange for their athletic
services.5
In 2014 and 2015, college football and both male and female
college basketball players filed class action complaints against the
NCAA’s grant-in-aid regulations.6  The athletes alleged that those
regulations violate antitrust law.7  Over the objection of the NCAA
and various collegiate conferences, Judge Claudia Wilken of the
Northern District of California certified classes of NCAA athletes
seeking to enjoin the NCAA from promulgating grant-in-aid regula-
from home to training/practice site at the beginning of the season/prep-
aration for an event and from training/practice/event site to home at the
end of season/event); (g) Medical treatment and physical therapy;(h) Fa-
cility usage; (i) Entry fees; and (j) Other reasonable expenses.
Id. See also Matt Hayes, Report Concludes 86 Percent of Student Athletes Live in Poverty,
SPORTINGNEWS (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-football/news
/4465460-student-athletes-poverty-paid-scholarships-ncpa-texas-duke [https://
perma.cc/UBU2-QZRZ] (stating that in 2013, 86% of college athletes lived below
poverty line and that NCAA views scholarships as worthy tradeoff for their
services).
4. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, at Bylaw 15.02.5 (allowing compensation R
up to cost of attendance). But see NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2014–15
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, Bylaw 15.02.5 (2014) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL
2014], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D115.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9Y84-WQX9] (capping grant-in-aid at “tuition and fees, room
and board, and required course-related books,” but declining to cover full cost of
attendance).
5. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, at Bylaw 12.02.2 (listing what compensa- R
tion is limited to by NCAA). Compare NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, at Bylaw 15.02.5
with NCAA MANUAL 2014, supra note 4, at Bylaw 15.02.5 (inserting compensation
up to cost of attendance after NCAA MANUAL 2014).
6. See generally Complaint, Alston v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 4:14-cv-
01011-CW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014); Complaint and Jury Demand – Class Action
Seeking Injunction and Individual Damages, Jenkins v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, No. 3:14-cv-01678-FLW-LHG (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014); Class Action Complaint,
Floyd v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 0:14-cv-01290 (D. Minn. Apr. 25, 2014);
Hartman v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 4:15-cv-15-00178 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13,
2015).
7. See generally Complaint, Alston v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 4:14-cv-
01011-CW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014); Complaint and Jury Demand – Class Action
Seeking Injunction and Individual Damages, Jenkins v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, No. 3:14-cv-01678-FLW-LHG (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014); Class Action Complaint,
Floyd v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 0:14-cv-01290 (D. Minn. Apr. 25, 2014);
Hartman v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 4:15-cv-15-00178 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13,
2015).
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tions that limit the ability of schools to distribute awards up to the
cost of attendance.8
Drawing on that victory, counsel for the plaintiffs now seek to
certify damages classes consisting of former and current athletes.9
These athletes allege that they would have received additional
funds up to the cost of attendance but for the grant-in-aid regula-
tions.10  These putative classes will attempt to show that the grant-
in-aid regulations violated antitrust law and that the players subject
to them should recover for the funds they claim they otherwise
would have obtained to cover the cost of their attendance.11  But
first, Judge Wilken must decide whether to certify the classes.12
The NCAA is no stranger to antitrust lawsuits concerning the
compensation of players.13  However, the now-pending consoli-
8. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532, 536 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting plaintiffs’ joint motion for
class certification of injunctive relief classes).
9. See generally Consolidated Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Certify
Damages Classes, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap
Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 4:14-md-02541) [hereinafter
Motion to Certify Damages Classes] (seeking certification of damages classes and
alleging NCAA and member institutions unlawfully restrained athlete
compensation).
10. See id. at 2 (characterizing “direct pecuniary harm” as the result of “a col-
lusive shortfall”).
11. See [Unredacted] Consolidated Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion to
Certify Damages Classes at 2, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-
Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 4:14-md-02541)
(seeking certification of damages classes and alleging NCAA unlawfully restrained
athlete compensation such that grant-in-aid was “typically several thousands of dol-
lars below the cost” to attend and play for one of schools).
12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (“At an early practicable time after a per-
son sues or is sued as a class representative, the court must determine by order
whether to certify the action as a class action.”).
13. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85
(1984) (holding NCAA engaged in price-fixing to suppress access to televised col-
lege football); O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (holding players failed to identify harm to competition based on de-
fendants’ restraint of licenses for players’ names and likeness), aff’d in part, vacated
in part by 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding NCAA compensation rules are
subject to antitrust regulation); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Li-
censing Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL 5979327 (N.C. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013)
(granting certification of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) alleging anti-
trust violations attributed to use of players’ names and likeness); White v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. CV 06-0999-RGK (MANx), 2006 WL 8066803 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 19, 2006) (granting motion for certification challenging NCAA grant-in-
aid limitations as violations of antitrust law); In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football
Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (holding walk-on football
players sufficiently plead antitrust action against NCAA); In re NCAA I-A Walk-On
Football Players Litig., No. C04-1254C, 2006 WL 1207915 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (deny-
ing class certification of putative class alleging antitrust violations in suppressing
walk-on player’s compensation).
3
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dated actions could meaningfully alter the way the NCAA compen-
sates collegiate athletes and could cost the NCAA, its member
conferences, and its member institutions’ damages.14
Just prior to the publication of this Comment, the parties to
this action agreed to settle.15  Judge Wilken granted preliminary ap-
proval but will still need to permit class members to object and po-
tentially opt-out of the settlement before she can make a final
determination that the class action meets the requirements of Rule
23.16  Despite the fact that the NCAA will no longer contest certifi-
cation, class approval is not automatic and this Comment will argue
that Judge Wilken should certify the damages classes.17  Part II of
this Comment will address the emergence of the grant-in-aid litiga-
tion, the requirements for class certification, and the arguments the
parties have made for and against certification.18  Part III will ana-
lyze the prospects of certification, ultimately arguing that Judge Wil-
ken should certify the damages classes, and that failure to do so
would undermine the utility of the class action device.19  Finally,
Part IV will conclude with a brief examination of the implications of
certification and denial.20
14. See Justin Sievert, The Forgotten Antitrust Case: How an NCAA Loss in Alston
Could Impact College Athletics, SPORTINGNEWS (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.sporting
news.com/ncaa-football/news/ncaa-antitrust-case-shawne-alston-effects-college-
athletics/1uro6chmw5naj1o6n15opblfmy [https://perma.cc/V7WK-82M4] (argu-
ing that recent grant-in-aid litigation “is a landmark era in college athletics
litigation”).
15. See Notice of Motion and Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic
Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 4:14-md-
02541) [hereinafter Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement] (seeking preliminary approval of settlement classes without the
NCAA’s opposition).
16. See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Ap-
proval of Class Action Settlement, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic
Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 4:14-md-
02541) [hereinafter Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settle-
ment] (granting preliminary approval on March 21, 2017, and setting out schedule
for remaining steps prior to possible final approval of the class action).
17. For a discussion on the pending motion to certify damages classes, see
infra notes 114–210 and accompanying text. R
18. For background on the creation of current grant-in-aid litigation, require-
ments for class certification, and the pending motion before Judge Wilken, see
infra notes 21–113 and accompanying text. R
19. For a discussion that argues putative damages classes should be certified,
see infra notes 114–210 and accompanying text. R
20. For a discussion on the ramifications of the pending grant-in-aid lawsuit
on class litigation and on college athlete compensation, see infra notes 211–223 R
and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND: A LAWSUIT TO CLEAN UP A MESS
CREATED LONG AGO
A. The Emergence of the Grant-in-Aid MDL
Prior to 1976, schools could only offer their athletes with small
amounts of funds in addition to funds given to cover academic ex-
penses.21  Those additional funds, commonly dubbed “laundry
money,” equaled around fifteen dollars per month per player at
that time, and were intended to cover such incidental expenses as
sundries, gas for the player’s cars, and, as the name implies, the cost
for players to launder their clothing.22  But that all changed in 1976
when the NCAA forbade such compensation and began strictly lim-
iting schools to compensating players for only a subset of school-
related expenses, altering NCAA regulations and pegging the ceil-
ing of total compensation at “grant-in-aid.”23  Grant-in-aid was ex-
pressly limited to tuition, university fees, room and board, and
required course materials by the NCAA.24
The NCAA recently amended the compensation structure to
permit compensation up to the full cost of attendance.25  But that
amendment fails to address the compensation of players who
played for NCAA schools prior to the alteration or at schools that
21. See Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9, at 5–6 (stating that R
before change in regulations, players received approximately fifteen dollars per
month in “laundry money”).
22. See id. (dubbing additional funds “laundry money”).
23. See id. See generally Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in its Second Century: De-
fender of Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 332–37 (2007) (out-
lining emergence of NCAA’s compensation of student athletes and regulation of
it); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, at Bylaw 12.02.2 (delineating categories of player R
compensation); id. at Bylaw 15.02.5 (defining grant-in-aid compensation).
24. See NCAA MANUAL 2014, supra note 4, at Bylaw 15.02.5 (capping grant-in-
aid at “tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-related books” but
declining to cover full cost of attendance).  Although schools may only offer a
certain number of full grant-in-aid scholarships each year, they must give a mini-
mum number of scholarships. See Steve Berkowitz & Andrew Kreighbaum, College
Athletes Cashing in with Millions in New Benefits, USA TODAY (last updated Aug. 19,
2015, 4:05 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/08/18/
ncaa-cost—attendance-meals-2015/31904839/ [https://perma.cc/7QYM-DSUE]
(specifying rule changes allowing athletes to be eligible for additional funds that
will cover additional cost of attendance expenses); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, at R
Bylaw 15.05.2 (amended grant-in-aid to include cost of attendance, not just educa-
tional expenses).
25. Between 2014 and 2015, the NCAA amended Bylaw 15.02.5 to permit
compensation up to the cost of attendance.  This occurred when numerous law-
suits challenging the grant-in-aid regulation were pending against the NCAA. See,
e.g., NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, at Bylaw 15.02.5 (allowing compensation up to R
cost of attendance).  But see NCAA MANUAL 2014, supra note 4, at Bylaw 15.02.5 R
(capping grant-in-aid at “tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-
related books” but declining to cover full cost of attendance).
5
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have not increased their award amounts in light of the amend-
ment.26  Furthermore, the amendment only permits schools to pro-
vide grant-in-aid up to the cost of attendance, but does not prevent
schools from providing grant-in-aid packages below the cost of
attendance.27
As a result of these shortcomings, in March 2014, two separate
class action complaints were filed on behalf of male NCAA football
and basketball players against the NCAA, which both alleged anti-
trust violations.28  First, putative class representatives filed Alston v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia, which sought to enjoin the NCAA from enforcing its grant-
in-aid regulations and to recover damages allegedly borne from
their suppressed compensation under the grant-in-aid limit that was
below their cost of attendance.29  Shortly after the Alston complaint
hit the docket, the Jenkins v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
putative class representatives, also hoping to represent male college
football and basketball players as classes, brought a similar class ac-
tion complaint seeking injunctive relief and damages in the District
of New Jersey.30  Both the Alston and Jenkins plaintiffs alleged that
the NCAA and its member institutions had violated section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act by conspiring to use grant-in-aid limits to
suppress the market for players’ services.31
26. See generally Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9 (averring re- R
laxation of grant-in-aid cap in 2015 fails to address previous market-wide suppres-
sion of compensation and has still left universities free to compensate players
below the cost of attendance).
27. See generally In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap
Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532, 536 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting plaintiffs’ joint mo-
tion for class certification).
28. See id. at 538 (citing two complaints filed against NCAA in separate federal
courts during March 2014).
29. See Complaint at 1–3, Alston v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 4:14-cv-
01011-CW (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 4, 2014) (seeking “an injunction that enjoins the
NCAA and the Power Conference Defendants from maintaining and abiding by
the present NCAA Bylaw that limits financial aid to the presently-defined [grant-in-
aid]” and “an award of damages for the difference between the grants-in-aid award
and the Cost of Attendance”).
30. See Complaint at 2, Jenkins v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, (No. 3:14-cv-
01678) (D.N.J. filed Mar. 17, 2014) (seeking “to permanently enjoin violations by
each of Defendant of the federal antitrust laws” and “to recover individual dam-
ages resulting from those violations”).
31. Hence, the argument goes, but for the suppression caused by the grant-in-
aid cap on compensation, competition for their services would have been higher,
as would their compensation. See Consolidated Plaintiffs’ and Jenkins Plaintiffs’
Amended Joint Motion for Class Certification at 6–8, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(No. 4:14-md-02541) (“Under the current NCAA Constitution and Bylaws, Plain-
tiffs and class members receive artificially depressed compensation for their labor
6
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The Alston plaintiffs expeditiously moved the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) to consolidate the related cases in
one federal district court via 28 U.S.C. section 1407.32  While that
motion was still pending, different plaintiffs brought an additional,
similar class action complaint in the District of Minnesota.33  Not-
withstanding the NCAA’s opposition, the JPML granted the motion
to consolidate, and in June of 2014, transferred all of the related
actions against the NCAA to Judge Wilken in the Northern District
of California in order to “eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent
inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to class certification;
and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel, and the
judiciary.”34
The newly-formed “consolidated plaintiffs” filed a joint motion
for class certification of injunctive relief classes in November 2014
that they eventually amended in February 2015 to add even more
parties who had filed other class action complaints in the interim
that had become part of the grant-in-aid litigation.35  Under the
motion, the consolidated plaintiffs sought and prevailed in certify-
ing classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) that now
seek to enjoin the NCAA from permitting full grant-in-aid awards
below the cost of attendance.36  In the wake of that success followed
the topic of this Comment, the now-pending motion to certify dam-
ages classes of NCAA athletes who allege that the market for their
services was unjustly suppressed, causing them antitrust injuries.37
services in the relevant labor markets.  But for those rules, and the conspiracy to
apply and enforce them, that compensation would be higher.”); see also generally
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2004) (outlining prohibition on monop-
olies and restraints of trade).
32. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.,
311 F.R.D. at 538 (stating that transfer motion was filed with JPML in March, the
same month complaints were filed); see also Motion of Plaintiffs for Transfer of
Actions to the Northern District of California Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1407 for Co-
ordinated or Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings, No. 2541 (J.P.M.L. Mar. 19, 2014)
(moving JPML to transfer Alston and Jenkins to Northern District of California).
33. Class Action Complaint, Floyd v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 0:14-
cv-01290 (D. Minn. Apr. 25, 2014) (seeking certification of both men’s and wo-
men’s basketball classes).
34. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 311 F.R.D at 538–39 (emphasis added) (noting history of litigation).
35. See id. at 538 (noting filing of Floyd while JPML motion was pending and
that Hartman was filed directly in the Northern District to add a class representa-
tive for female basketball players).
36. See id. at 536 (granting certification but noting that consolidated plaintiffs
had not yet moved to certify damages classes under Rule 23(b)(3)).
37. See generally Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9 (moving to R
certify damages classes of collegiate male football players and both male and fe-
male basketball players).
7
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B. Rule 23: The Certification of Class Actions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 dictates that a judge must
certify a class action because it is brought in the aggregate by one or
several members of a proposed class who purport to represent indi-
viduals who are absent from the litigation and may know nothing
about the litigation at inception.38  In federal courts, Rule 23 cre-
ates a heavy burden for certification with the intention of safe-
guarding the rights of absent class members and preserving the
preclusive effect of a class action judgment.39
Class certification itself starts with four threshold requirements
under Rule 23(a)(1)–(4): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy.40  But satisfaction of Rule 23(a) is only the beginning,
because at least one of the four possible types of class actions under
Rule 23(b) must also be met for a court to certify a class.41
In meeting the demands of certification, the first threshold re-
quirement of all class actions is Rule 23(a)(1) or “numerosity.”42
Meeting numerosity is only possible if the proposed “class is so nu-
merous that joinder of all members is impracticable.”43  The crux
of numerosity is not whether a certain minimum number of puta-
38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (stating suits may be brought on behalf of others).
39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (specifying requirements for valid class actions in
federal courts).  Additionally, class actions are regulated by case law and other stat-
utes, like the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28. U.S.C. section 1332(d).  Be-
cause class actions are brought on behalf of individuals who are likely unaware of
the pending litigation, additional requirements like notice are often required so
that class members can opt-out.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (specifying require-
ments of notice for 23(b)(3) classes). But see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (stating
notice is optional for 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) classes).  Moreover, because the
rights of class members will be subject to any preclusive effect of a class judgement,
it is vital that absent class members are adequately represented to assure their due
process rights are not infringed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring adequate
representation).
40. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:1 (5th ed.
2011) (introducing class actions and requirements of Rule 23(a)).
41. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rules for Cer-
tain Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rules of Criminal Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69,
100 (1966) (stating that the Rule 23(a) requirements are “perquisites” and “neces-
sary but not sufficient conditions for a class action” but that “Subdivision (b) de-
scribes the additional elements which in varying situations justify the use of a class
action”).  For certification of the damages classes here, only Rule 23(b)(2) and
Rule 23(b)(3) are relevant because the injunctive classes were certified under
23(b)(2) and the consolidated plaintiffs have proposed the damages classes under
Rule 23(b)(3).  See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Anti-
trust Litig., 311 F.R.D. at 547 (granting certification of injunctive relief classes
under 23(b)(2)); Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9, at 15 (bringing R
certification of damages classes pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3)).
42. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 40, § 3:11 (introducing how joinder may be R
impracticable).
43. FED. RULE. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
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tive class members exist, but rather whether joinder of class mem-
bers would be impracticable.44  Otherwise, joinder is preferable
because class actions by their very nature diminish the due process
rights of the individual litigants.45  When Judge Wilken previously
certified the injunctive relief classes in the grant-in-aid litigation,
she found the requirement of numerosity was met because there
were thousands of putative class members (current NCAA players
subject to the NCAA’s grant-in-aid restrictions on player compensa-
tion) dispersed throughout the country.46
The second requirement for certification comes from Rule
23(a)(2) and is called “commonality,” which demands that “there
are questions of law or fact common to the class.”47  Commonality
asks whether there is at least one common question of law or fact
shared by all the putative class members, because without at least
one such common issue, there would be nothing to bind the class
together.48  Looking again at the certification of the injunctive clas-
ses in the grant-in-aid litigation, Judge Wilken held that commonal-
ity was met because the consolidated plaintiffs alleged that the
grant-in-aid violations applied generally to the class as a whole, giv-
ing rise to common questions of whether the grant-in-aid regula-
tion violated antitrust law and thereby impacted individual class
members.49
44. See Phila. Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 463 (E.D.
Pa. 1968) (approving class action of possibly only twenty-five litigants).
45. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40–41 (1940).
It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence
that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which
he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party
by service of process. A judgment rendered in such circumstances is not
entitled to the full faith and credit which the Constitution and statute of
the United States prescribe and judicial action enforcing it against the
person or property of the absent party is not that due process which the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments requires. To these general rules there
is a recognized exception that, to an extent not precisely defined by judi-
cial opinion, the judgment in a ‘class’ or ‘representative’ suit, to which
some members of the class are parties, may bind members of the class or
those represented who were not made parties to it.
Id. (citations omitted).
46. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.,
311 F.R.D at 539.
47. FED R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 40, § 3:18 (introducing R
concept of commonality).
48. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (holding that
a putative class representative must “affirmatively demonstrate” that they are “pre-
pared to prove” that common question of law or fact applies to purported class).
49. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.,
311 F.R.D. at 539.
9
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The third requirement for certification comes from Rule
23(a)(3) and requires “typicality” of the putative class representa-
tive, meaning that the representative parties of the putative class
must have claims or defenses that are “typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class.”50  Typicality is supposed to assure that class rep-
resentatives are archetypal members of the class, so that by
pursuing their own interests, they will concurrently benefit the class
as whole.51  Recalling again the certification of the injunctive classes
in the grant-in-aid litigation, the court held that typicality was met
because all of the putative class representatives were the recipients
of grant-in-aid awards and all alleged that the identical grant-in-aid
regulations resulted in “cognizable antitrust injuries” for themselves
and the class alike.52
The final requirement from Rule 23(a) is called “adequacy”
and is met if the proposed “representative parties will fairly and ad-
equately protect the interests of the class.”53  With a class action,
parties that will be bound by the results of the litigation are notice-
ably absent from the action, and thus their due process rights can
only be protected by adequate representation.54  Though the lan-
guage of Rule 23(a)(4) calls for an evaluation of the “representative
parties,” Rule 23(g)(4) requires a court to examine the adequacy of
class counsel.55  After an extensive battle on this point during certi-
50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (defining typicality).  This provision of Rule
23(a) serves to guard against the possibility that the class representative is actually
not representative of the class as a whole, but does not require that the class repre-
sentative and class members have identical claims. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,
150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (1998) (“Under the rule’s permissive standards, representative
claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class
members; they need not be substantially identical.”).
51. See P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 15-3726-MWF (PLAx),
2015 WL 5752770, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2015) (“[T]ypicality insists that the
class representative be a member of the class and have claims similar to those of
other class members, and the requirement rests upon the belief that such a repre-
sentative, pursuing her own interests, will pursue the class’s as well.”) (quoting
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 40, § 3:28). R
52. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.,
311 F.R.D at 539–40.
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
54. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940) (“[T]here is scope within the
framework of the Constitution for holding in appropriate cases that a judgment
rendered in a class suit is res judicata as to members of the class who are not
formal parties to the suit.”); see also RUBENSTEIN, supra note 40, § 3:50 (“Adequate R
representation is therefore the capstone of the Rule 23(a) requirements: it ensures
that the class’s champion will pursue its interests sufficiently well so as to produce a
judgment that can fairly bind all members of a group who cannot appear before
the court individually.”).
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4) (requiring that “[c]lass counsel must fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class”).  Prior to 2003, adequate counsel
10
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fication of the injunctive relief classes, Judge Wilken ultimately held
that adequacy was met by the representatives of the injunctive relief
classes because their pursuit of the injunction against the NCAA
permitting grant-in-aid caps below cost of attendance would benefit
all class members.56
Though not an express requirement, often interlaced with all
of the threshold elements is the implicit concern of whether the
class itself is ascertainable.57  If class members cannot be identified
or ascertained, then class certification fails because without an idea
of who belongs to the class, a court cannot readily determine if
members are numerous, they share common issues, the class repre-
sentatives are typical, and whether their representation of the
unidentifiable class members would be adequate.58  In approving
the injunctive relief classes in the grant-in-aid litigation, the court
made no mention of ascertainability, therefore indicating that the
identification of class members was not an issue.59
Once the threshold aspects of Rule 23(a) have been met,
under Rule 23(b)(3) plaintiffs may bring a class action to recover
damages.60  The rule requires that common questions of law and
fact implicated by Rule 23(a)(2) must “predominate over any ques-
tions affecting only individual members,” such that “a class action is
was not expressly required by Rule 23 but was often read into Rule 23(a)(4). See
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 40, § 3:52. R
Although Rule 23(a)(4) provides that a class action may be maintained
only if ‘the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the in-
terests of the class,’ courts have long used Rule 23(a)(4) as an invitation
to scrutinize the adequacy of class counsel as well as the adequacy of the
class representatives. That review arguably exceeded the authority that Rule
23(a)(4) gave a court, but Congress closed that gap—if gap it had been—
when, in 2003, it enacted Rule 23(g).
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4)).
56. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.,
311 F.R.D at 545.
57. See Lilly v. Jamba Juice Co., 308 F.R.D. 231, 235–37 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dis-
claiming awareness of any Supreme Court of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals prece-
dent requiring ascertainability of class members, but joining with other courts in
holding that class must inherently be definite to recover under Rule 23(b)(3)).
58. See Mazur v. Ebay Inc., 257 F.R.D. 563, 567 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that
class defined as those who would have won unsuccessful eBay bids but for phony
bidders was unascertainable).
59. See generally In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Anti-
trust Litig., 311 F.R.D at 532–47 (making no mention of ascertainability issues).
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).  Injunctive relief classes can also seek incidental dam-
ages that are not the main focus of the litigation, but seeking any damages under
23(b)(2) has recently been strongly discouraged by the Supreme Court. See Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363–64 (holding that class of female Wal-
Mart employees that sought damages under 23(b)(2) was not properly certified in
part because 23(b)(2) failed to provide procedural protections of 23(b)(3)).
11
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superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudi-
cating the controversy.”61  Thus, certification under Rule 23(b)(3)
is itself a two-part process: first, whether the common questions of
law or fact predominate over individual issues, and second, whether
a class action is superior to other forms of adjudication.62  Predomi-
nance requires that there is some common core issue, central to the
parties’ dispute, but does not require that the predominating issue
is dispositive of the case or that the parties have identical dam-
ages.63  Superiority can be boiled down to determining whether
proceeding as a class would be superior to proceeding as a set of
individual actions, which often may be impracticable for plaintiffs
with small amounts of individual damages to pursue.64  It is impor-
tant to note, however, that class certification is not based solely on
the pleadings but instead requires the court to apply “rigorous anal-
ysis” to the plaintiff’s motion to certify.65
C. The Athletes’ Side: Pending Motion to Certify Damages
Classes in the Grant-in-Aid MDL
The consolidated plaintiffs began their pursuit of certification
of the damages classes just like they did with the injunctive relief
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(emphasis added).
62. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997).
To qualify for certification under Rule 23(b)(3), a class must meet two
requirements beyond the Rule 23(a) prerequisites: Common questions
must ‘predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers’; and class resolution must be ‘superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.’ In adding ‘pre-
dominance’ and ‘superiority’ to the qualification-for-certification list, the
Advisory Committee sought to cover cases ‘in which a class action would
achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote . . . uni-
formity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing
procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.
Id.
63. See Sacred Heart Health Sys. v. Humana Military Healthcare Servs., 601
F.3d 1159, 1183 (11th Cir. 2010) (reversing certification of class of 260 hospitals
that sued insurers for underpayment of patients’ reimbursements, finding class
failed to satisfy predominance because of distinctive contract terms, substantive
contract law, and plaintiffs’ individual defenses).
64. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1024 (9th Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that superiority requires a “comparative evaluation of alternative mechanisms
of dispute resolution”); see also RUBENSTEIN, supra note 40, § 4:85 (“The superiority R
inquiry tests which of the alternatives is likely to be the most fair and efficient
method of adjudication, and the ‘superior’ moniker implies that the search is for
the best of the lot.”).
65. Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 350–51 (“Rule 23 does not set forth a mere
pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demon-
strate his compliance with the Rule. . . . [C]ertification is proper only if the trial
court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have
been satisfied.” (internal quotations omitted)).
12
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classes, because Rule 23(a) must always be satisfied for successful
certification.66  Accordingly, the consolidated plaintiffs asserted
that the putative class members are so numerous that joinder would
be impracticable because there are thousands of current and for-
mer NCAA athletes dispersed throughout the country, which is
demonstrated by the NCAA’s “squad lists” that show the members
of the various schools’ teams.67  Furthermore, the consolidated
plaintiffs argued that commonality is satisfied because there are nu-
merous, significant common questions of law and fact revolving
“around the central issues of the existence and effect of the alleged
conspiracy in restraint of trade” via the grant-in-aid caps on ath-
letes’ compensation.68
The consolidated plaintiffs likewise purported that the putative
class representatives satisfy typicality because they all allege to have
been subject to the same antitrust violation and the same resulting
harm, with the antitrust violation being the cap on grant-in-aid and
the harm being reduced compensation.69  Putative class representa-
tives and putative class members therefore both would have other-
wise obtained additional funds in absence of the cap, making the
class representatives typical.70  Adequacy is satisfied, the consoli-
dated plaintiffs argued, because no conflicts of interest exist be-
tween the putative class representatives and the putative class, and
consequently, the class representatives’ pursuit of damages will ben-
efit the class as a whole.71  Furthermore, the consolidated plaintiffs
argued that class counsel are seasoned class action litigators and
66. The plaintiffs’ proposed damages classes mirror those certified under
Rule 23(b)(2), though they allow for the additional inclusion of recipients of par-
tial grant-in-aid awards.  See Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9, at R
9–10 (proposing three damages classes: one consisting of NCAA male football
players, one consisting of NCAA men’s basketball players, and one consisting of
NCAA women’s basketball players).
67. Id. at 11–12 (arguing numerosity was met on similar grounds in different
class action against NCAA regarding name and likeness of players in media) (cit-
ing In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2013
WL 5979327, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013)).
68. Id. at 12 (noting interrelationship between common questions under
23(a)(2) and predominance of common questions under 23(b)(3)).
69. See id. at 12–13.  The consolidated plaintiffs claimed that typicality was
“plainly met here” as it was in the White litigation where the plaintiffs alleged a
horizontal agreement between NCAA and member institutions to fix the grant-in-
aid award amounts. See White v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. CV 06-0999-
RGK (MANx), 2006 WL 8066803, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2006) (finding
typicality).
70. See Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9, at 13 (stating class R
members and representatives rely on identical “facts and legal theories”).
71. See id. at 13–14 (stating interests of class members and representatives are
“squarely aligned”).
13
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therefore adequate.72  Although not expressly required by Rule
23(a), the consolidated plaintiffs lastly assured the court that the
putative class is ascertainable because the NCAA possesses “squad
lists” that reflect the scholarship status of all putative class
members.73
With the threshold of Rule 23(a) purportedly satisfied, the
consolidated plaintiffs turned to the predominance and superiority
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).74  In an antitrust case, predomi-
nance is satisfied if a price-fixing conspiracy existed, that conspiracy
caused injury, and the injury resulted in damages.75  The consoli-
dated plaintiffs first maintained that the NCAA and member institu-
tions engaged in systematic price-fixing by instituting the 1976 cap
on grant-in-aid below the cost of attendance.76  They further argued
that common proof will show that the defendants violated antitrust
law by suppressing the market for the consolidated plaintiffs’ ser-
vices.77  Consolidated plaintiffs purported that they could “utilize
class-wide economic evidence to demonstrate that Defendants vio-
lated the antitrust laws” based on statistical modeling by their ex-
pert, Dr. Daniel Rascher.78  Thus, the consolidated plaintiffs
claimed that they could demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy
by showing that the conduct of the NCAA and its member institu-
72. See id. at 14 (noting both Hagens Berman and Pearson Simon have sub-
stantial experience with complex antitrust suits against the NCAA).
73. See id. at 14–15 (stating that squad lists will easily ascertain class
membership).
74. See id. at 15.
75. See id. (citing In re Static Random Access (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. C
07-01819 CW, 2008 WL 4447592, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (finding predom-
inance satisfied by class of direct purchasers of SRAM for computers)).
76. See id. at 16 (referring to documents already produced and stating that
“[t]here is a very substantial amount of documentary evidence and other proof
illustrating the existence of the conspiracy.”).
77. See id. (citing three documents with illustrative quotes by NCAA’s agents
implying conspiracy).
78. Id. at 16–17.  Relying on their expert Dr. Rascher, plaintiffs highlighted
the five following issues that will be common and predominate among the class:
(1) [T]he process for identifying relevant markets and demonstrating
market power, (2) the anti-competitive harm that all Class Members have
suffered, and the common proof by which this anti-competitive harm can
be proven, (3) the analysis of Defendants’ purported pro-competitive jus-
tifications, (4) the analysis of Plaintiffs’ proffered less restrictive alterna-
tives, and (5) the fact that, but for the restraint, NCAA member schools
would have competed more vigorously to acquire the services of Division
I athletes, thereby increasing the value of Class Members’ scholarships.
Id.
14
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tions demonstrates that a conspiracy suppressed the compensation
of college athletes.79
But showing a conspiracy is only the first step, and consoli-
dated plaintiffs must furthermore show that class members were ac-
tually injured by the antitrust activity.80  To that end, consolidated
plaintiffs asserted that examining the period before the NCAA insti-
tuted the grant-in-aid regulations and comparing it to the period
after the NCAA removed the grant-in-aid cap will demonstrate the
impact the regulations had on the market when the cap was in
place.81  The consolidated plaintiffs proposed to show two types of
injuries through the statistical analysis of compensation data from
before and after the grant-in-aid caps.82  Under the first method of
purported market-wide economic harm, the NCAA’s regulations al-
legedly had depressed the market, and the subsequent relaxation of
the cap and the emergence of cost of attendance scholarships dem-
onstrates the harm class members suffered before the NCAA per-
mitted schools to compensate players up to the cost of
attendance.83  For the second type, called pecuniary harm, the con-
solidated plaintiffs claimed they will show that class members would
have received greater compensation for their services in the ab-
sence of the grant-in-aid cap.84
The consolidated plaintiffs argued that they have models in
place that can ascertain the damages with more than enough accu-
79. Id. at 17 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S.
Ct. 1184, 1194–95 (2013) (finding predominance was not undermined in fraud-
on-the-market case because investors conceivably could have considered immate-
rial representations by the defendant when making their investments)).
80. For a description on the process for finding predominance, see supra
notes 60–65 and the accompanying text. R
81. See Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9, at 17–18.  Recall that R
prior to the introduction of the grant-in-aid cap, schools provided players with
additional sums above and beyond tuition, but ended that practice when the cap
came into effect in 1976.  Relatedly, since the amendment in 2015 to the grant-in-
aid cap, some schools have begun to reevaluate the aid they offer to athletes, with
some compensating players up to the cost of attendance. See id. at 18; see also supra
notes 21–27 and accompanying text. R
82. See Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9, at 17–19 (proposing R
common impact of artificially-depressed cap on athletic scholarships resulting in
“market-wide economic harm” of grant-in-aid cap and “pecuniary harm” to the
players themselves).
83. See id. at 18–19 (arguing actions by NCAA member institutions before and
after cap was lifted demonstrate market-wide impact).
84. See id.  The players who were subject to pecuniary harm are further bro-
ken down into two groups: one consisting of players at schools which immediately
offered full cost of attendance aid once the regulations were changed, and those at
schools that have offered only some compensation above the original grant-in-aid
amount or will in the future receive aid up to the cost of attendance. See id. at
19–20.
15
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racy to satisfy the certification stage of the case.85  They character-
ized the method as “simple,” requiring only that they first identify
the players who would have achieved greater compensation but for
the original grant-in-aid cap, and then mathematically calculate the
damages sustained due to that cap based on Dr. Rascher’s projec-
tions.86  Lastly, consolidated plaintiffs noted that class treatment of
these small claims is “superior” than if the players brought individ-
ual actions and, furthermore, that counsel are more exceedingly
qualified to handle the class litigation.87  Therefore, plaintiffs al-
leged that the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) are satisfied
and the damages classes should be certified.88
D. The NCAA’s Side: Opposition to Certification
of Damages Classes
On August 26, 2016, the NCAA filed a brief in opposition to
the consolidated plaintiffs’ proposed certification of damages clas-
ses under Rule 23(b)(3), making three primary arguments to un-
dermine predominance.89  First, the NCAA argued that
predominance would fail because individual plaintiffs would not be
able to demonstrate that the grant-in-aid regulation harmed all
85. See id. at 17 (stating “[a]ll the Court must do is find that [consolidated]
Plaintiffs have ‘come forward with seemingly realistic methodologies.’” (quoting In
re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. M 02-1486 PJH,
2006 WL 1530166, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006))).
86. Id. at 21 (stating Dr. Rascher’s method requires only the squad lists of
those who are receiving cost of attendance, those receiving above the old cap on
grant-in-aid, and those who attend schools that have committed to attaining cost of
attendance scholarships).
87. Id. at 23–24 (arguing that class litigation is preferable because any amount
individual plaintiffs recover would preclude them from pursuing litigation
individually).
88. See id. at 24–25 (concluding that class should be certified because NCAA
violated antitrust laws and thousands of players suffered same harm).
89. See generally Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Oppo-
sition to Consolidated Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Damages Classes, In re Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 4:14-md-02541) [hereinafter Opposition to Motion to Cer-
tify Damages Classes]  (opposing certification of damages classes).  Unlike in its
opposition to the certification of the injunctive relief classes under Rule 23(b)(2),
the NCAA seemingly conceded that the elements of 23(a) were satisfied in the
consolidated plaintiffs’ brief, because the NCAA immediately plunges into an at-
tack of the consolidated plaintiffs’ purported satisfaction of predominance under
Rule 23(b)(3). See id. at 9 (beginning defendants’ brief with “[t]he particular in-
quiry here concerns the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)” and never addressing
Rule 23(a), which always must be satisfied for class certification).  The certification
sought here was about the same regulation and brought on behalf of overlapping
groups of players as the injunctive relief classes. See id. Thus, it seems that because
Rule 23(a) was met there, it also will be here. See generally id.
16
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plaintiffs in a common way, and would instead have to show how it
impacted each player individually.90  While the market-wide impact
model might show that competition for the services of players was
reduced by the NCAA’s previous grant-in-aid regulations, the NCAA
claimed that the market-wide impact theory fails to show that each
individual suffered injury as a result of the allegedly weakened mar-
ket for their services.91  Thus, the NCAA contended that “[s]imply
put, common ‘proof of conspiracy is not proof of common in-
jury.’”92  Furthermore, the NCAA attacked the consolidated plain-
tiffs’ inclusion of partial grant-in-aid recipients in the class
definitions, alleging the compensation of those players was subject
to highly individualized questions, different from those of players
who received full grant-in-aid awards, thus again undermining
predominance.93
The NCAA next turned to the consolidated plaintiffs’ theory of
pecuniary harm, and argued that the consolidated plaintiffs will be
unable to show that each plaintiff sustained the same damages and
that this should prove to be a fatal flaw for predominance.94  Essen-
tially, the NCAA maintained that each individual athlete has been
compensated based on a unique assessment by distinct schools.95
Even if that compensation had been untethered from the previous
grant-in-aid structure, the NCAA contended that a valuation of
damages would require an individualized assessment of that ath-
lete’s compensation and how it would have been determined by the
diverse set of factors utilized by schools that ultimately provided
that aid.96  Purportedly, even different players on the same team at
90. See id. at 10–11 (claiming plaintiffs cannot satisfy necessary precursor of
showing there was antitrust violation before showing their was antitrust impact).
91. See id. at 11–14 (alleging consolidated plaintiffs cannot show substantive
case and therefore fail to achieve rigorous standard of class certification).
92. Id. at 13 (quoting Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 572 (8th Cir.
2005)).
93. See id. at 11–12 (arguing consolidated plaintiffs do not and cannot
demonstrate that common questions predominate with regard to which partial
grant-in-aid recipients).
94. See id. at 14 (citing concession by Dr. Rascher that not every putative class
member was injured by the grant-in-aid regulation because some would not have
received larger scholarships).
95. See id. at 17.
The enormous body of evidence adduced by plaintiffs from the individual
schools shows that the way they award financial aid to student-athletes
and account for that aid varies from school to school, and may vary from
student-athlete to student-athlete within the same school, and from year
to year for the same student-athlete.
Id.
96. See id. (characterizing Dr. Rascher’s model as flawed by arguing that iden-
tical monetary awards would actually be product of different calculations).
17
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the same school who both received full grant-in-aid awards had
been compensated based on a unique assessment; therefore, evi-
dence between teammates would not even be helpful in determin-
ing damages for class members.97
Lastly, the NCAA argued that predominance does not exist be-
cause the amount of damages sustained by each player would be
different, leading to highly individualized assessments of damages,
thereby eliminating the predominance of common issues.98  Even
with regard to schools that, since the amendment to the grant-in-
aid cap, have expanded their players’ compensation up to the cost
of attendance, the NCAA challenged the assumption that these
players would have been compensated to a greater amount than
they were when grant-in-aid was capped below the cost of attend-
ance.99  According to the defendants, each individual athlete’s com-
pensation package would need to be evaluated to determine what
additional compensation he or she would have received, if any, in
the absence of the grant-in-aid cap.100  Common questions could
not predominate then, if each player was so uniquely impacted by
the regulation.101
Furthermore, ascertaining whether an individual even is a class
member will require an individualized assessment that vitiates pre-
dominance, according to the NCAA.102  Former players may have
received less than a full grant-in-aid award because other forms of
aid existed, such as Pell grants, that would allow the school to di-
minish the grant-in-aid below the scholastic expenses it was permit-
ted to cover, and thereby free up additional scholarships funds and
slots for other athletes.103  The NCAA maintained that there is no
definitive proof that these players would have received full grant-in-
97. See id. (alleging scholarship award to Georgetown basketball player one
year will not prove anything about award to same player in different year).
98. See id. at 11 (stating calculating individual damages will vitiate
predominance).
99. See id. at 19 (claiming Dr. Rascher “speculates, with no absolutely no fac-
tual or economic support” that players who attend schools that have since raised
their awards would have been given cost of living scholarships in absence of grant-
in-aid caps).
100. See id. at 21 (citing Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 266 (3d. Cir.
2011) (upholding denial of certification where plaintiffs attempted to show com-
mon injury by averaging for medical monitoring class)) (opining that averages will
not illuminate what particular player would have been awarded).
101. See id. (stating jury would have to make individualized assessments of lia-
bility which would undermine predominance).
102. See id. at 21–22 (arguing partial grant-in-aid recipients should be
excluded).
103. See id. at 22 (noting potential reductions in grant-in-aid awards due to
other financial aid sources).
18
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aid in the absence of the cap, and that even if there were, the an-
swer to that question would require an individualized assessment of
each player’s aid package.104
In sum, the NCAA argued that damages calculations will not be
mechanical and will instead entail complex evaluations of each
player’s “unique financial aid packages comprised of athletics-based
aid and often one or more of the hundreds of different federal,
state, local, institutional or association-sponsored grants.”105  The
athletes who competed at the various NCAA programs involved re-
ceived unique evaluations of and unique awards for their services
that would consequently result in unique damages if an antitrust
violation even had occurred.106  Therefore, the calculation of dam-
ages would be highly complicated because of the disparate sources
of aid players received and would require individualized attention
under the Seventh Amendment.107
E. The Athletes’ Retort: Consolidated Plaintiffs’ Reply in
Support of Certification
On October 7, 2016, the consolidated plaintiffs filed a reply to
challenge the NCAA’s argument that their expert’s methodology
will not satisfy predominance by failing to produce class-wide proof
of antitrust injury and pecuniary damages.108  The consolidated
plaintiffs also confronted the NCAA’s attack on their inclusion of
partial grant-in-aid recipients which the NCAA claimed would mud-
104. See id. at 23 (“But neither Dr. Rascher nor the plaintiffs have any idea,
with respect to any partial [grant-in-aid] recipient, whether their receipt of a par-
tial [grant-in-aid] was really just an accounting issue, or something more serious.”).
105. Id. at 24 (stating “the evidence conclusively establishes that Division I
institutions have often treated a particular scholarship differently from on student
to another in a given year, and from one year to another for the same student”).
106. See id. at 24–25 (citing defense expert Dr. Jonathan Orszag and conclud-
ing that proof of damages will be a complex and individualized task for a jury).
107. See id. at 25 (opining that short ten-minute presentations on each alleg-
edly injured player’s aid could take up 16,900 hours of jury time and that this
unmanageable and highly individualized feature undermines predominance and
the superiority of class treatment).
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII
108. See Consolidated Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Certify Damages Classes at 5–14, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic
Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 4:14-md-
02541) [hereinafter Reply in Support of Motion to Certify Damages Classes] (con-
tending that application of Dr. Rascher’s statistical models will apply common
methodology in mechanical fashion to putative class members).
19
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dle the ascertainability of the classes.109  Regarding partial grant-in-
aid recipients, the consolidated plaintiffs responded that various
places in the NCAA’s records indicate who received partial awards,
and that other offsetting awards like Pell grants are also reflected in
the NCAA’s own records.110  The NCAA possesses most of the
records that will determine class membership, with the member
universities possessing any others, so the consolidated plaintiffs pro-
posed that the records may be voluminous, but the process is sound
and should not defeat predominance because putative class mem-
bers are ascertainable via the records.111
Lastly, the consolidated plaintiffs challenged the NCAA’s argu-
ment that the calculations of a class member’s damages will be
highly individualized and thus should eliminate predominance of
common issues.112  The consolidated plaintiffs maintained that the
difficulty of calculating damages does not itself defeat predomi-
nance, especially because the proof of damages relies on a common
statistical model developed by their expert, Dr. Rascher, that can be
applied mechanically to determine damages for each individual
class member.113
III. ANALYSIS: WHY CERTIFICATION IS PROPER AND WHAT IT MEANS
FOR CLASS LITIGATION
It is not surprising that the parties have filed dense briefs for
and against certification of the damages classes, because certifica-
tion is often the central focus of class litigation.114  The fact that the
injunctive relief classes were certified does not guarantee that the
109. See generally id. at 2–5 (responding to NCAA’s opposition).
110. Id. at 13–14 (arguing that, but for the grant-in-aid cap, the players whose
awards were offset by other sources of aid like Pell grants still would have received
larger awards).
111. See id. at 3 (claiming “all the law requires” for ascertainability is that class
members can be identified by “objective criteria”).
112. See id. at 13–14 (asserting Dr. Rascher’s algorithm will uniformly calcu-
late damages).
113. See id. at 14 (citing Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th
Cir. 2014) (holding the complexity of damages calculations alone is insufficient to
defeat class certification)).
114. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 99 (2009).
With vanishingly rare exception, class certification sets the litigation on a
path toward resolution by way of settlement, not full-fledged testing of
the plaintiffs’ case by trial.  In terms of their real-world impact, class set-
tlements can be quite significant, potentially involving dollar sums in the
hundreds of millions or requiring substantial restructuring of the defen-
dant’s operations.
Id.
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damages classes will be, particularly because class certification re-
quires “rigorous analysis,” meaning Judge Wilken must probe into
the merits of the case itself.115  While the parties have agreed to
settlement and Judge Wilken has granted preliminary approval of
the class action, preliminary approval of a class action settlement
only requires only a cursory analysis and Judge Wilken will still need
to determine that the class action meets the demands of Rule 23
before entering a final order of approval.116  Thus, despite the re-
cent developments in this case, this Section will analyze the merits
of the parties’ arguments against the backdrop of Rule 23 to argue
that Judge Wilken ultimately should certify and grant final approval
to the class action.117  Due to the prospect of millions of dollars in
damages, successful certification should change the way college ath-
letes are compensated, but this case should also serve as a vessel to
highlight the important role statistical analysis can and should play
in satisfying predominance.118
A. Satisfaction of Rule 23(a)(1)—Numerosity
Even though the NCAA has seemingly conceded the Rule
23(a) factors in its opposition to the motion for certification, the
Northern District of California will still need to ensure that each
factor is met.119  Fortunately for the consolidated plaintiffs, here
numerosity should be met because it was met for the injunctive re-
lief classes in this same grant-in-aid MDL.120  In the published opin-
ion certifying the injunctive relief classes, this same court noted
115. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (“With the same
concerns in mind, we reiterate today that a Title VII class action, like any other
class action, may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous
analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.”).
116. See Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement,
supra note 16, at 6 (granting preliminary approval and setting fairness hearing for R
November 17, 2017); Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement, supra note 15, at 5 (“Preliminary approval is thus not a dispositive as- R
sessment of the fairness of the proposed settlement, but rather determines
whether it falls within the ‘range of possible approval.’”).
117. For a discussion advocating certification, see infra notes 119–194 and ac- R
companying text.
118. For a discussion on the broad impact of the certification of this case and
the use of statistical evidence to show predominance, see infra notes 195–210 and R
accompanying text.
119. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161 (stating the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) must
always be satisfied for certification); see also Opposition to Motion to Certify Dam-
ages Classes, supra note 89, at 9 (ignoring potential arguments against Rule 23(a) R
elements of Motion to Certify Damages Classes).
120. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Anti-
trust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing In re Citric Acid Antitrust
Litig., No. 95-1092, C-95-2963 FMS, 1996 WL 655791, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2,
21
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that joinder of the various NCAA players throughout the country
would be impossible and held that Rule 23(a)(1) was met.121  Here,
the damages classes are technically larger than the injunctive relief
classes, because the damages classes include all players during a
time period between March 5, 2010, and March 21, 2017, the date
of preliminary approval.122  In contrast, the injunctive relief classes
were limited to players who received full grant-in-aid awards, mean-
ing that the damages classes must be larger due to the fact that they
include partial grant-in-aid recipients.123  If joinder of the smaller
injunctive relief classes was impracticable, then joinder of the larger
damages classes must be too, and therefore numerosity should be
met in the eyes of the court.124
B. Satisfaction of Rule 23(a)(2)—Commonality
Although the NCAA outwardly did not contest commonality,
Judge Wilken will still need to ensure that commonality is met be-
cause all threshold requirements must be met for certification.125
Also, common issues logically may not predominate pursuant to
23(b)(3) if there are not common issues pursuant to 23(a)(2) from
which predominance may arise.126  Again, fortunately for the con-
solidated plaintiffs, commonality should also easily be met here, in
part because commonality was not an issue during certification of
the injunctive relief classes.127  Because the NCAA’s grant-in-aid
limits gave rise to commonality for the injunctive relief classes, the
grant-in-aid limits will also satisfy commonality for the damages clas-
1996)) (finding numerosity met where plaintiffs indicated that class membership
would be dispersed nationwide)).
121. See id. (noting “proposed classes comprise thousands of potential mem-
bers because of the numerous FBS football and Division I men’s and women’s
basketball programs implicated”).
122. See Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9, at 9–10 (defining R
three damages classes); Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Set-
tlement, supra note 16, at 2 (specifying termination of class eligibility on date of R
preliminary approval).
123. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Li-
tig., 311 F.R.D at 537 (defining three injunctive classes, each including only full
grant-in-aid recipients).
124. See id. at 539 (finding numerosity satisfied by injunctive relief classes).
125. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (requiring elements
of Rule 23(a) prior to certification).
126. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 40, § 4:51 (stating “[t]he predominance de- R
mand is stricter than Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement,” implying that
they are interlinked).
127. See Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9, at 12 (arguing com- R
mon issues exist).
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ses because the grant-in-aid caps are the same and the classes
overlap.128
The court should not question whether there are common an-
swers to how the grant-in-aid caps affected the class. 129  In Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, female employees of Wal-Mart alleged that Wal-Mart’s cor-
porate policy of allowing discretion among store managers to make
their own pay and raise decisions had the effect of systematically
depressing the compensation of the female employees.130  The Su-
preme Court decertified that class, holding that commonality was
not satisfied because, although all of the individual employees were
subject to Wal-Mart’s overall policy that gave managers the discre-
tion to make pay decisions, the individual employees could have
still been subject to unique evaluation by distinct managers who
made individualized assessments of whether or not to give their em-
ployees a raise.131  This gives rise to an argument that the individual
players are subject to the unique assessment of individual schools
that have the discretion to make their own decisions about how to
compensate players, much like how Wal-Mart’s corporate office
gave discretion to its individual store managers to make unique as-
sessments of individual employees.132
That argument is unlikely to work for commonality, however,
because Dukes was about the certification of Rule 23(b)(2) injunc-
tive relief classes that had tagged some damages onto the action,
perhaps as a way of circumventing predominance, which is differ-
ent than the current case where certification is brought strictly as
Rule 23(b)(3) damages classes.133  Moreover, the plaintiffs in Dukes
tried to show that a policy of decentralized discretion was the cause
of the lower wages of female Wal-Mart employees, which is not as
obviously a common issue as the current case where all the consoli-
dated plaintiffs were subject to a consistent, centralized uniform
128. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Li-
tig., 311 F.R.D at 539 (finding commonality met and not in dispute).
129. See Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9, at 18 (arguing anti- R
trust liability is itself common question and its resolution will provide common
answer to whether NCAA is liable to each class member).
130. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342–45 (alleging dis-
crimination of female employees via corporate policy of permitting wide discretion
in pay and raise decisions).
131. See id. at 357 (“Other than the bare existence of delegated discretion,
respondents have identified no ‘specific employment practice’—much less one
that ties all their 1.5 million claims together.  Merely showing that Wal–Mart’s pol-
icy of discretion has produced an overall sex-based disparity does not suffice.”).
132. See id. (stating “merely proving that the discretionary system has pro-
duced a racial or sexual disparity is not enough”).
133. See id. at 345–46 (stating plaintiffs rely on 23(b)(2) to certify class).
23
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policy capping their compensation at the grant-in-aid amount.134
Finally, as stressed above, commonality should be met here because
Judge Wilken already found commonality satisfied by the injunctive
relief classes and predicated that finding on the same grant-in-aid
cap at issue in this case.135
C. Satisfaction of Rule 23(a)(3)—Typicality
Typicality is also easily met by the consolidated plaintiffs’ class
representatives because they are technically even more representa-
tive than the class representatives were for the injunctive relief clas-
ses.136  With the injunctive relief classes, the proposed and
eventually appointed class representatives had graduated after the
emergence of the grant-in-aid litigation, so they were actually no
longer subject to the grant-in-aid caps that they sought to enjoin the
NCAA from perpetuating.137  The court applied the transitory ex-
ception to mootness, stating that although the claims of the individ-
ual class representatives were moot, those of others were not and
that the litigation could proceed.138
Here, that issue should not even come up because the class
representatives are seeking damages for past conduct, not an in-
junction against future conduct.139  Thus, the backwards-looking
claims of the putative class representatives of the damages classes
are still alive and well and cannot be mooted by graduation, making
them even more “typical” than the proposed class representatives
134. See id. at 354–55.
The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence convincingly estab-
lishes is Wal–Mart’s “policy” of allowing discretion by local supervisors over
employment matters. On its face, of course, that is just the opposite of a
uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality
needed for a class action; it is a policy against having uniform employment
practices.
Id. at 355 (emphasis in original).
135. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Anti-
trust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding commonality met by
injunctive relief classes).
136. See id. at 539–40 (holding typicality met by injunctive relief classes,
though their individual claims have been mooted).
137. See id. at 539 (noting that “[t]he complexity, pace and cutting edge na-
ture of this [MDL] affected the timing of this Court’s class certification hearing
and decision,” and consequently class representatives were no longer NCAA
athletes).
138. See id. (stating counsel should replace named plaintiffs with players cur-
rently eligible to receive grant-in-aid but that claims may proceed regardless).
139. See Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9, at 11 (alleging class R
representatives were subject in the past to “identical unlawful practices”).
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were in the certification of the injunctive relief classes.140  There-
fore, the court should find typicality met by the representatives for
the NCAA football and basketball players.141
D. Satisfaction of Rule 23(a)(4)—Adequacy
The final prong of Rule 23(a), adequacy, faced the fiercest op-
position during the certification of the injunctive classes against the
NCAA in the grant-in-aid litigation, but it should not here.142  Es-
sentially, the NCAA argued against certification of the injunctive
relief classes on the grounds that adequacy was not demonstrated
because of the theories proposed by the NCAA’s expert; the “substi-
tution effect” theory and the “economics of superstars” theory.143
Using the substitution effects theory, the NCAA argued that
compensation to NCAA athletes would increase in the absence of
the current grant-in-aid structure, making scholarship offers more
attractive.144  Accordingly, more attractive scholarship opportuni-
ties would induce more prospective athletes to vie for compensa-
tion packages from schools, and consequently at least some current
recipients of grant-in-aid would be adversely impacted because they
would lose some or all of their scholarship funds to increased com-
petition.145  But Judge Wilken held that hypothetical intraclass con-
flicts are insufficient to vitiate class certification, and the court held
that the effects on the market for NCAA athletes presents specula-
tive impacts on the market and the compensation of putative class
members.146
140. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Li-
tig., 311 F.R.D. at 537 (defining classes in injunctive relief motion as those “who
received or will receive such a full grant-in-aid” (emphasis added)).
141. See Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9, at 9–10 (defining R
classes in damages motion as those who “received” grant-in-aid awards (emphasis
added)).
142. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Li-
tig., 311 F.R.D. at 540–45 (finding adequacy met by injunctive relief classes after
lengthy discussion of NCAA’s counterarguments).
143. See id. at 540 (arguing changes to grant-in-aid would open market up for
collegiate athlete’s services to detriment of some athletes and make compensation
system more akin to professional athletics).
144. See id. at 542 (predicting that “ ‘increases in the amount of athletics-based
aid would naturally induce some people to accept or continue to receive such
scholarships that otherwise would choose not to participate as FBS/D-I scholarship
student-athletes’”).
145. See id. (noting theory by Dr. James Ordover, the NCAA’s expert, that
“additional players” would emerge to take scholarship funds from class members).
146. See id. at 543 (holding NCAA failed to show both that additional athletes
would enter the market and that schools would withdrawing grant-in-aid offers to
current players).  As an aside, while it seems possible that greater scholarship op-
portunities would induce more individuals to seek scholarship opportunities at a
25
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Similarly, the NCAA pointed to the “economics of superstars
theory,” positing that without the current grant-in-aid structure,
schools would compete to obtain superstar athletes to the financial
detriment of players who would have otherwise obtained full grant-
in-aid.147  The court declined to adopt the defendants’ view because
schools need not distribute their scholarships funds to players that
are not superstars now, yet in practice they routinely have distrib-
uted the maximum amount of scholarships.148  Simply put, because
schools already compensate as many players as they can with the full
grant-in-aid amount, the court reasoned that schools must value the
contributions of full grant-in-aid recipients at least as greatly as the
value of the grant-in-aid.149  Absent the current regulations, it
would not be obvious, according to the court, that schools would
suddenly reevaluate player compensation such that athletes would
suddenly receive less compensation than they already do.150
The NCAA’s final argument was that some putative class mem-
bers would be disadvantaged by a system that lacked the current
grant-in-aid regulations because the schools they attend or might
attend would not be able to afford to compensate the players.151
The court rejected this argument, finding that it is not obvious that
NCAA schools would suddenly be unable to afford college sports.152
later date, it seems unlikely that an increase in scholarship funds now would im-
pact the pool of talent today.  Simply put, it takes too long to become a NCAA-level
athlete and essentially anyone who could currently become an NCAA athlete today
has the opportunity to become one. See id.
147. See id. at 543 (predicting 60% of football players and 40% of men’s bas-
ketball players would receive reduced grant-in-aid because of schools’ ability to
compensate superstars).
148. See id. at 544 (“Dr. Ordover does not explain why schools today provide
full [grant-in-aid] to purportedly overvalued class members without being required
to do so and would stop doing so absent the [grant-in-aid] cap.”).
149. See id. (citing Dr. Roger Noll, consolidated plaintiffs’ expert, in holding
that past practices of compensating allegedly underqualified athletes with full
grant-in-aid awards supports the inference that the schools value those players’
contributions at least as much as the grant-in-aid amount awarded).
150. See id. (holding NCAA failed to establish that system of compensation
would change to the detriment of current grant-in-aid recipients).
151. See id. (“Defendants predict that an injunction would increase the costs
to schools of participating in FBS and Division I athletics and, in turn, schools
would stop participating in FBS and Division I athletics or take steps to lower their
costs, such as offering fewer [grant-in-aid awards].”).
152. See id. at 545 (noting availability of alternative sources of funding, such as
redistributing expenditures, subtracting from endowments, seeking additional do-
nations, reducing coaching and staff salaries).  Furthermore, the court noted the
disproportionate increase in schools’ incomes from athletics compared to the es-
sentially static value of grant-in-aid. See id. Notably, salaries of coaches and other
sources of expenditure have increased tremendously over the years, undermining
the economic infeasibility of shifting those funds to the players instead of coaches
and administrators. See id. In sum, the court noted that alternative revenue
26
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol24/iss2/3
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\24-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 27 10-MAY-17 8:58
2017] CLASS IS IN SESSION 263
Additionally, even if schools were losing money on their sports pro-
grams, they have nonetheless continued to invest in them, leading
the court to conclude that these schools may very well still value
their sports programs at least as much as they spend on them, even
if that expense does not strictly itself turn a monetary profit.153
However, because those arguments failed to convince Judge
Wilken during certification of the injunctive relief classes, they
should not undermine a finding of adequacy with regard to the
certification of the damages classes.154  Here, the court should note
that the proposed class representatives will all adequately embody
the interests of the class as a whole because the NCAA failed to
show that the class representatives’ pursuit of the suspension of the
grant-in-aid limitations would harm putative class members during
its opposition to certification of the injunctive relief classes.155  The
damages classes seek to recover past and current scholarship funds
that were effectively lost because of the suppression of the market,
but the damages will be limited to a set period of time.156  There-
fore, the NCAA fails to undermine adequacy here because the dam-
ages classes seek to impose only a one-time fee on the NCAA that
could not impact the availability of scholarship funds to players who
are class members that are already set to receive funds.157  Addition-
ally, class counsel here, who are identical to the injunctive relief
certification, were adequate and highly experienced there and
would necessarily have to be more experienced now with the in-
junctive relief certification under their belts.158  Therefore, ade-
quacy should not be a considerable roadblock for the court in
evaluating whether to certify the damages classes.
streams could be available to universities so that they could offset the increase to
cost that a system without the current grant-in-aid cap. See id.
153. See id. (citing Dr. Edward Lazear’s expert report that continued invest-
ment in “sports programs even when net revenues are negative means that schools
value the programs at least as much as the amount they spend on them”).
154. See id. (holding that injunctive classes satisfied Rule 23(a)(4)).
155. See id. at 542–45 (analyzing Substitution Effects and Economics of Super-
stars arguments and finding them insufficient to undermine adequacy of class
representatives).
156. See Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9, at 9–10 (defining R
classes as individuals who received grant-in-aid awards during a particular period).
157. For a discussion on the damages that the damages classes seek to re-
cover, see supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text. R
158. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Li-
tig., 311 F.R.D. at 545 (finding class counsel of injunctive relief classes adequate).
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E. Satisfaction of Rule 23(b)(3)—Predominance and Superiority
While the Rule 23(a) requirements should be met easily, the
consolidated plaintiffs have a serious fight on their hands when it
comes to predominance.159  The NCAA has argued that the proof
of antitrust injury will require individualized assessments, that the
damages themselves will be subject to individualized assessments,
and that the inclusion of the partial grant-in-aid recipients destroys
predominance, and each argument presents a huge burden for the
consolidated plaintiffs, with loss on any aspect effectively ending
the litigation.160
In evaluating predominance and the regarding proof of the
injury and damages caused by the grant-in-aid limits, the Northern
District of California will likely consider Comcast Corporation v. Behr-
end161 because Comcast Corporation is one of the newest Supreme
Court cases to address predominance and the use of statistics.162  In
that case, the trial court certified a class that sought to compensate
Comcast subscribers in the Philadelphia area that were allegedly
part of a monopoly.163  The plaintiffs’ theory rested on the notion
that competitors declined to enter the Philadelphia cable market
because of Comcast’s anticompetitive practices.164  Plaintiffs ob-
tained 23(b)(3) certification by comparing the Philadelphia market
with nearby markets where Comcast faced competition to create a
statistical model that compared prices between the adjacent mar-
kets and the Philadelphia area markets to demonstrate how pricing
in Philadelphia would have functioned in the absence of Comcast’s
allegedly anticompetitive practices.165  However, the Supreme
Court reversed and held that the plaintiffs’ statistical model failed
159. See generally Opposition to Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note
89, at 1–25 (arguing that court should deny consolidated plaintiffs’ motion for R
certification of the damages classes).
160. See generally id.  Furthermore, defendants isolate the fact that cost of at-
tendance aid was not forbidden under the previous grant-in-aid regulations but
only that an athlete’s “athletics-based” grant-in-aid “was limited to tuition, room,
board, books and fees. Id. at 2.  The NCAA argues that fact further undermined if
some athletes were even injured at all, i.e., the ones who received cost of attend-
ance aid via other forms. See id.
161. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
162. See id. at 1434–35 (holding plaintiffs failed to demonstrate predomi-
nance via statistical model).
163. See id. at 1430 (stating plaintiffs’ suit against Comcast and affiliates over
alleged monopolization of Comcast services in Philadelphia area).
164. See id. at 1430–31 (alleging Comcast’s clustering of services in Philadel-
phia metro area deterred “overbuilders,” or outside competition, but declining to
certify class based on plaintiffs’ other three theories of liability).
165. See id. at 1431 (projecting class-wide damages via regression model total-
ing $875,576,662).
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to show that common issues predominated because three of the
four premises of the statistical model had been excluded from evi-
dence via a successful Daubert motion.166
Here, the NCAA’s best chance of vitiating predominance may
come from undermining the consolidated plaintiffs proposed proof
of injury, with the intention of convincing Judge Wilken the grant-
in-aid MDL is similar to Comcast Corporation and, consequently, that
the consolidated plaintiffs’ theory cannot demonstrate injuries on a
class-wide basis.167  But Comcast Corporation is distinguishable in a
crucial way: the expert’s methodology was partially excluded so that
the actual model the Comcast Corporation plaintiffs had relied on to
show class-wide damages was maimed and flawed.168  Here, al-
though Dr. Rascher’s testimony and models proposed to prove
damages have been subject to a challenge under Daubert, his testi-
mony has not yet been excluded.169  If Judge Wilken excludes Dr.
Rascher’s testimony, then the consolidated plaintiffs will not be
able to show predominance in terms of the common way that the
grant-in-aid structure impacted them, unless they obtain another
expert.170  But if the court finds the models plausible, like it did
during certification of the injunctive relief classes where it found
Dr. Rascher’s statistical modeling persuasive, then the statistical
proof will stand and not destroy predominance.171
166. See id. at 1433 (stating “[t]here is no question that the model failed to
measure damages from the particular antitrust injury on which petitioners’ liability
in this action is premised[ ]” because other theories of antitrust injury remained
inherent in the model proposed by the plaintiffs); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–95 (specifying requirements for admis-
sion of expert evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
167. See Opposition to Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 89, at 8 R
(citing Comcast v. Behrend to support the need for the court to “probe behind the
pleadings” and assess the merits of consolidated plaintiffs’ theory of liability).
168. See Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1431 (noting that only one of plaintiffs’
theories of causation was admitted but that plaintiffs’ model “did not isolate dam-
ages resulting from any one theory of antitrust impact”).
169. See generally NCAA’s Defendants’ Notice of Motion, Motion and Memo-
randum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof to Exclude the Opinions of
Dr. Daniel A. Rascher, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid
Cap Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 4:14-md-02541) [herein-
after NCAA’s Daubert Motion] (seeking to exclude the opinions and testimony of
consolidated plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Daniel Rascher).
170. See Opposition to Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 89, at 3 R
(claiming consolidated plaintiffs have proposed “ipse dixit pronouncements based
on unsupported assumptions and speculations that are contrary to the factual re-
cord” rather than an actual statically supported model).
171. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Anti-
trust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532, 545 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (following Dr. Rascher’s reason-
ing that schools would not be forced into prohibitive budgetary dilemma by
absence of grant-in-aid regulation).
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The NCAA’s argument that the inclusion of partial recipients
of grant-in-aid will destroy predominance is even weaker.172  The
NCAA and the various universities have extensive records, and the
identity of those players should be easy to ascertain.173  Moreover,
the court could tell the consolidated plaintiffs that additional sub-
classes are needed for the partial grant-in-aid classes to assure that
their interests are adequately represented by independent coun-
sel.174  Thus, the inclusion of partial recipients here should not be a
significant roadblock to certification and should not disrupt
predominance.
The NCAA’s facially stronger argument, that different damages
calculations will destroy predominance, also should not convince
the court to deny certification.175  For starters, courts are typically
reluctant to find the difficulty of damages dispositive.176  However,
the NCAA’s best hope is that the court will be convinced that the
way the grant-in-aid limits limited each school’s autonomy resulted
in individual, unique financial aid awards, because that would make
it seem like the damages could not be calculated but would have to
be determined by an individual hearing.177
On that issue, the Supreme Court has recently continued its
dialogue on statistical proof of damages in class actions in Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo.178  That case involved employees at a pork
processing plant and the time they spent “donning and doffing”
172. See Opposition to Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 89, at R
21–24 (arguing that partial grant-in-aid recipients preclude predominance).
173. See Reply in Support of Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note
108, at 7–10 (arguing partial grant-in-aid recipients should not undermine R
predominance).
174. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) (“When appropriate, a class may be divided
into subclasses that are each treated as a class under this rule.”).
175. See Opposition to Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 89, at 25 R
(arguing if each athlete’s individual damages assessment took ten minutes, then
total trial “would exceed 16,900 hours of jury time”).
176. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 40, § 4:54 (“‘[A] fraud perpetrated on nu- R
merous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situa-
tion for a class action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for
separate determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the class.’” (emphasis
added) (quoting Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rules for
Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note
41)). R
177. See Opposition to Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 89, at R
24–25 (arguing individual hearings will be needed to demonstrate damages).
178. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016) (find-
ing plaintiffs could use aggregate proof to establish liability as it was “the only
practicable means to collect and present relevant data”).
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their protective gear before and after butchering pigs.179  Starting
in 1998, Tyson paid its employees for four additional minutes each
shift, as that was the time Tyson estimated that it took employees to
put on and take off their gear.180  The policy changed in 2007, re-
sulting in some employees receiving four to eight minutes of paid
time, while others received none, depending on which jobs the em-
ployees performed and which gear they consequently needed to
wear for their particular roles.181  The plaintiffs alleged that the
“donning and doffing of gear” was an “integral and indispensable”
part of all of their jobs, and thereby covered by the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (“FLSA”) as work.182  Because Tyson neglected to keep
accurate records of the time each of its employees spent donning
and doffing, and because an award of damages would be based on
this lost time, the plaintiffs sought to prove the average donning
and doffing time by statistical analysis.183
The defendants argued that donning and doffing time varied
from person to person and therefore that individual issues would
destroy predominance under Rule 23(b)(3).184  Specifically, they
argued that the “person-specific inquiries into individual work time
predominate[d] over the common questions raised by [plaintiffs’]
claims, making class certification improper.”185  The statistical study
179. See id. at 1041 (“The employees’ primary grievance was that they did not
receive statutorily mandated overtime pay for time spent donning and doffing pro-
tective equipment.”).
180. See id. at 1042 (stating that as result of lawsuit in 1998, defendant began
paying all employees extra four minutes, dubbed “K-code time,” so they could put
on their necessary work-related gear).
181. See id. (“In 2007, Tyson stopped paying K-code time uniformly to all em-
ployees.  Instead, it compensated some employees between four and eight minutes
but paid others nothing beyond their gang-time wages.”).  “Gang-time” was the
time employees spent at their workstations. See id.
182. See id. (“The FLSA . . . requires employers to pay employees for activities
‘integral and indispensable’ to their regular work, even if those activities do not
occur at the employee’s workstation.”) (citing Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 255
(1956)). Tyson cites Steiner, which held that necessary and essential activities per-
formed before or after the start of a shift are compensable under the FLSA, so
long as they are not excluded under section 4(a)(1). See Steiner, 350 U.S. at 255.
183. See Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1042–44 (stating section 211(c) of FLSA
requires timekeeping of employee hours).  The plaintiffs relied on the defendant’s
records on gang-time and K-code time to construct model predicting lost wages.
See id.
184. See id. at 1044 (specifying that defendant sought to set aside the jury
verdict because “variation in donning and doffing time” mean that “the classes
should not have been certified”).
185. Id. at 1046 (claiming employees would have to show how much time they
individually spent putting on the necessary equipment for work); see also IBP, Inc.
v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 42 (2005) (holding that time spent waiting to don and doff
necessary equipment was not covered by FSLA).
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proposed by the plaintiffs was characterized as manufacturing pre-
dominance by attempting to subsume diverse amounts of time that
putative plaintiffs may have spent donning and doffing into one set
amount of time.186  Furthermore, the defendants expressly re-
quested that the Court institute a broad rule against the use of sta-
tistical evidence to establish liability in class actions.187  But the
Supreme Court declined to do so and instead found that the plain-
tiffs had satisfied predominance, noting furthermore that that oft-
entimes statistics are “‘the only practicable means to collect and
present relevant data’ establishing a defendant’s liability.’”188
In this case, the ramifications of Tyson Foods are tremendous
because without a statistical model to show exactly how much play-
ers were undercompensated, the consolidated plaintiffs would be
left trying to ascertain what various schools would have paid each
athlete in the absence of the grant-in-aid cap based on testimony of
the schools and their administrators.189  The consolidated plaintiffs
would be in the same position that the Tyson Foods plaintiffs success-
fully avoided, where they would be required to retroactively recon-
struct the minutes they each had worked to recover damages.190
Now, with the help of their expert, consolidated plaintiffs should be
able to demonstrate projections of what player compensation would
have been through statistical analysis, like the plaintiffs in Tyson
were able to, and therefore should satisfy predominance and dodge
the NCAA’s contention that individual hearings will be required to
determine damages. 191
186. See Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1046 (arguing for categorical exclusion
of statistical evidence by claiming plaintiffs’ study “manufactures predominance by
assuming away the very differences that make the case inappropriate for classwide
resolution”).
187. See id. (claiming use of representative evidence “unfair”).
188. Id. (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.493
(2004)) (denying categorical prohibition on use of particular type of evidence in
particular types of cases and holding that statistical evidence is often only means of
proof available)).
189. See Opposition to Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 89, at R
24–25 (arguing that individual questions of how much each player would have
been compensated will require individual hearings).
190. For further discussion on the individualized proof of damages, see supra
note 100 and accompanying text.
191. For an outline on how the consolidated plaintiffs propose to generate
damages assessments for individual plaintiffs, see supra notes 60–88 and accompa- R
nying text.  It is also worth noting that for certification plaintiffs need only show
that their model is capable of proving damages on a class-wide basis but the calcu-
lation of damages is still a question of fact. See Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1045
(stating predominance may be satisfied even when some issues require a
factfinder’s individualized determination).
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Additionally, although not thoroughly addressed in the brief-
ing, the damages classes clearly meet the superiority demands of
Rule 23(b)(3).192  Any monetary recovery of an athlete would be
the small amount of “laundry money” the players claim they would
have gotten without the restrictions on grant-in-aid over the course
of at most a few seasons.193  Litigating a case for such small amounts
would not only be unwise, it would simply never happen.194
F. The Consequences for Class Action Litigation
Finally, in a broader sense, this case highlights the important
role of class litigation and presents an opportunity for the court to
safeguard the access to courts granted by the class action device.195
The NCAA is effectively trying to force this class action to diverge
into a mini-trial on the merits at the certification stage.196  While
class actions certification requires rigorous analysis, it does not re-
quire that the putative class representatives completely prove their
case in chief.197  Instead, to satisfy predominance, it is enough to
show that the putative class will either win or lose through common
proof but does not actually need to win a trial at certification.198  In
Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, the Su-
preme Court held that a class of individuals who possessed retire-
ment trust fund plans had satisfied predominance.199  To prevail on
192. See generally Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9; Opposition R
to Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 89; Reply in Support of Motion to R
Certify Damages Classes, supra note 108 (declining to argue class method would R
not be superior, save because of alleged lack of predominance).
193. See Motion to Certify Damages Classes, supra note 9, at 18 (describing R
laundry money).
194. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome
the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class
action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential
recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.
Id. (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 334 (7th Cir. 1997)).
195. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (finding
“[e]conomic reality dictates that petitioner’s suit proceed as a class action or not at
all” where $70 sums were so small not to warrant individual representation).
196. For a discussion on predominance, see supra notes 89–107 and accompa- R
nying text.
197. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (holding class ac-
tion certification requires rigorous analysis to ensure elements of Rule 23 are met).
198. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2011) (charac-
terizing class questions as those that can be decided together).
199. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184,
1191 (2013) (holding plaintiffs did not need to prove materiality of defendant’s
representations at certification despite needing to prove materiality to prevail on
merits).
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the merits in their action where the class alleged the defendant en-
gaged in fraud on the market, that fraud had been material in im-
pacting the market for the defendant’s stock—a fact the plaintiffs
did not prove at certification.200
Consequently, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs failed
to satisfy predominance because they failed to show the materiality
of defendant’s alleged misrepresentations, and that therefore certi-
fication should never have occurred.201  However, Justice Ginsburg,
writing for the majority, held that the defendant “would have us put
the cart before the horse” because “a Rule 23(b)(3) certification
ruling is not to adjudicate the case; rather, it is to select the
‘metho[d]’ best suited to adjudication of the controversy ‘fairly and
efficiently.’”202
For certification, it was enough for the plaintiffs in Amgen to
show that the common issues would be resolved by a uniform
method, and that holding should guide this case as well. 203  The
language of Rule 23 never calls for full-blown merits analysis at cer-
tification and doing so would result in an inequitable shift in power
to defendants in all types of class litigation.204  Getting a class certi-
fied is already a tall order, but turning certifications into a mini-
trials would essentially give defendants a second bite at the apple to
avoid liability.205
Rule 23 already provides a court with the ability to amend its
certification order to alter the class’s composition or outright
200. See id. at 1190 (describing the fraud on the market theory as some false
misrepresentation disrupting the otherwise efficient market for a security that is
priced according to public, and allegedly truthful, information).
201. See id. at 1191 (summarizing defendant’s position as plaintiffs failed to
show that the defendant’s statements made any impact on the defendant’s stock
price).
202. Id. (alteration in original) (finding defendant misunderstood that Rule
23 does not require plaintiffs to show they will win lawsuit at certification).
203. See id. (holding that failure to prove materiality of impact of defendant’s
misrepresentations on stock price would not vitiate predominance but would cause
plaintiffs to completely lose).
204. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974)
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a
court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a
suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class ac-
tion. . . . In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not
whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will
prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are
met.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
205. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–51 (2011) (holding
that valid class certification requires rigorous analysis that Rule 23 requirements
have been met).
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decertify it.206  If a court finds that a certified class does not, in fact,
establish predominance once its proof is fully put before the trier of
fact, the defendants, with the approval of the court, are free to pull
the rug out from under the class and decertify it, thus ensuring that
the elements of Rule 23 are always met.207  Moreover, Rule 23’s lan-
guage does not automatically grant appeal after class certification,
so treating a class certification order like a final judgment appears
to be beyond the intentions of the rule itself.208
The NCAA winning this motion would have the effect of signif-
icantly weakening the utility of the class action device for all liti-
gants who oftentimes only have statistical proof available to litigate
their case.209  Additionally, a victory for the NCAA could essentially
graft requirements into Rule 23 that the legislative process has not
yet envisioned.210  Thus, so long as Dr. Rascher’s testimony survives
the Daubert motion to exclude it, the consolidated plaintiffs should
obtain certification, leaving the damages classes able to seek recov-
ery for the financial aid they claim they would have otherwise
received.
IV. CONCLUSION
The timetable for certification and the NCAA’s Daubert motion
was extended and modified numerous times before the parties
most recently agreed to settlement.211  However, whether the settle-
ment is approved will take at least until the end of 2017, but regard-
less, this case is certain to add to the growing jurisprudence on the
206. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) (defining class certification as conditional).
207. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (“Even after a certi-
fication order is entered, the judge remains free to modify it in the light of subse-
quent developments in the litigation.”).
208. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (providing that “[a] court of appeals may permit
an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification”)(emphasis
added).
209. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016) (speci-
fying statistics were the only form of proof plaintiffs had available to them).
210. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184,
1196 (2013) (holding that during certification plaintiffs need not “prove that the
predominating question will be answered in their favor”).
211. See Stipulation and Order Resetting Schedule for Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Certify Damages Classes as Modified, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic
Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 4:14-md-
02541) (rescheduling hearing on motion to certify damages classes for March 21,
2017); Stipulation and Order Resetting Schedule for Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify
Damages Classes, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap
Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 4:14-md-02541) (adding vari-
ous deadlines regarding fact discovery and dispositive motions); Order Granting
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, supra note 16, at 6 (approving R
preliminary settlement, setting schedule through 2017).
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use of statistics in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions and to the number of
class actions that have challenged the NCAA’s strict grip on the
compensation of college athletes.212
Certification of the damages classes, or now dubbed settlement
class and subclasses, would likely be the end to the NCAA’s suppres-
sion of its athletes’ compensation below the cost of attendance, but
it importantly does not mean that the NCAA will suddenly become
a free agent market for talented athletes.213  The injunctive relief
classes in this same grant-in-aid MDL only seek to prohibit the prac-
tice of allowing grant-in-aid scholarships below the cost of attend-
ance but would leave untouched the NCAA’s ability to regulate
essentially all other aspects of athlete compensation.214
Settlement could cost the NCAA and member institutions mil-
lions of dollars, although trial could have arguably had additional
negative effects on college athletics.215  Detractors to the settlement
might tenuously argue that compensating players for the scholar-
ship funds they missed out on in the past is tantamount to paying
athletes, and that compensation will have detrimental effects on the
collegiate system.216  But while the finances are large, the NCAA is
in no position to fail on account of this lawsuit and potential settle-
ment, or lose its vital role in regulating college athletics, meaning
that any fear that this lawsuit will disrupt college athletics forever is
largely unfounded.217
212. See Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement,
supra note 16, at 6 (scheduling fairness hearing for settlement on November 17, R
2017, meaning no decision will occur until sometime after).  For a discussion on
the use of statistics in satisfying the predominance requirement of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), see supra notes 159–210 and accompanying text.  For an R
outline of the various class action complaints that have challenged the NCAA, see
supra note 13 and accompanying text. R
213. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Anti-
trust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532, 544 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that consolidated plain-
tiffs do not seek free agent market for player’s services).  The NCAA would
maintain its role in regulating player compensation, but just would not be able to
suppress compensation below competitive levels in violation of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act. See id.
214. See id.  (advocating continued role for NCAA in setting compensation).
215. See id. (arguing that some schools may withdraw from athletics all
together).
216. See e.g. John R. Thelin, Here’s Why We Shouldn’t Pay College Athletes, MONEY
(Mar. 1, 2016), http://time.com/money/4241077/why-we-shouldnt-pay-college-
athletes/ [https://perma.cc/N9V9-522L] (arguing that paying athletes for their
performance would have serious tax implications and might result in less funding
to individual athletes and therefore should be avoided).
217. See id. (specifying that NCAA’s role in regulating athletics is not
threatened); see also Revenue, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/fi
nances/revenue [https://perma.cc/X6SE-PHQE] (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) (stat-
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Thus, it seems unlikely that the NCAA will be able to continue
to suppress athlete compensation in the same manner going for-
ward, if for no other reason than it has lifted the cap on grant-in-aid
that was previously below cost of attendance, indicating that it is
economically feasible for the athletes to have their full cost of at-
tendance covered.218  Even if Judge Wilken denies certification of
the settlement, it is unlikely the schools would continue to compen-
sate players below their cost to attend school because now the facts
surrounding the compensation are readily available, with this case
presenting a public record, highlighting that numerous administra-
tors in different college programs have objected to that practice
over the years.219
Moreover, as NCAA athletics have expanded to become big
business where the coaches make more than all of the players’
scholarships combined, where new facilities are built and staffs of
assistant coaches blossom, it becomes increasingly untenable to ar-
gue that players should not have their needs to attend college met
by the NCAA and the member schools.220  Some restructuring may
need to occur with how schools allocate their resources, and it is
feasible that the NCAA might see diminished profits at least for a
time, but making sure that the players who built that success are
fairly compensated is a worthy trade-off.221
While the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism appears to be
an important aspect of college sports, there is nothing to say it will
not remain so if the NCAA and its member institutions ultimately
have to compensate the athletes for scholarship funds they would
have earned but for the grant-in-aid limitations.222  Surely if athletes
ing that NCAA’s revenue was $871,600,000 in 2011–2012, significantly higher than
any liability in this case).
218. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Li-
tig., 311 F.R.D. at 545 (holding, additionally, that there are various ways schools
could reallocate their funds).
219. See generally Declaration of Steve W. Berman, supra note 1 (outlining R
complaints made over years by administrators from various NCAA Division I pro-
grams about inability to compensate their players to level they felt appropriate
because of grant-in-aid limitations).
220. See Chris Isidore, College Coaches Make More than Players Get in Scholarships,
CNN MONEY (Jan. 11, 2016, 12:28 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/11/
news/companies/college-coaches-pay-players-scholarships/ [https://perma.cc/
CU2J-YT6T] (stating college coaches make more in salary than total cost of all
player’s scholarships).
221. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.,
311 F.R.D. at 545 (stating reallocation of funds could minimize impact of in-
creased total funds allocated to scholarships).
222. See Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited
Feb. 11, 2017) (“Amateur competition is a bedrock principle of college athletics
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in NCAA programs are students first and athletes second, the
NCAA should welcome the opportunity to ensure that all of their
athletes are able to afford the various, incidental expenses that
every student accrues and not mind paying back those who missed
that opportunity and perhaps struggled financially while earning
their educations.223
Michael D. Ford*
and the NCAA. Maintaining amateurism is crucial to preserving an academic envi-
ronment in which acquiring a quality education is the first priority.”).
223. See id. (“In the collegiate model of sports, the young men and women
competing on the field or court are students first, athletes second.”).
* J.D. Candidate, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law, May
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